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Abstract
This paper aims to determine the solidity of the notion of the "coffee
paradox" using annual data from 1977 to 2007. In the confines of an
export supply model, we analyze the effects of export coffee price
on export volume. Price and profit equation are used to determine
the effects of market power on export coffee price and measure
changes in the retail and export price. We also estimate the elasticity
of transmission and price asymmetry as a means of verifying the
"coffee paradox." Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Instrumental Variables
(IV), and simultaneous equation with Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR) methods of econometric analysis are employed. Empirical re-
sults suggest that the world coffee market is characterized by "coffee
paradox" due to different changes between retail and export prices
of coffee, and that it is the existence of market power in importing
countries that is the main contributor to the condition of price
asymmetry.
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1. Introduction
Approximately  2.5  billion  cups  of  coffee  are  consumed  each  day  around  the 
world, and this rate of consumption ranks coffee as the fifth most actively trad-
ed commodity in the world (ICO1, 2005). In the past several decades, the inter-
national  coffee  market  has  undergone  major  changes  which  include,  in  partic-
ular, a shift in general policy setting, including volatile prices and varying pro-
duction levels. Figure 1 indicates that export volumes of coffee and the differ-
ences between export prices and retail prices of coffee have gradually increased 
since  1977.   
In  light  of  these  occurrences,  some  have  argued  within  the  world  of 
coffee  for  the  existence  of  a  so  called  “coffee  paradox2,”  characterized  by  a 
“coffee boom” in coffee consuming countries, a widening gap between producer 
and  consumer  prices,  and  a  “coffee  crisis”  in  producing  countries  (Morisset, 
1997;  Krivonos,  2004;  Daviron  and  Ponte,  2006;  and  Pierre,  2007).  Pierre 
(2007) makes reference to this paradox and claims that there were at least three 
different  explanations  for  the  coffee  paradox.  They  include:  1)  oversupply;  2) 
reconstruction and concentration within the world coffee market; and 3) the ex-
istence  of  price  asymmetry  in  the  transmission  of  price  changes.
The main objectives of this paper are to: 1) determine an export supply 
model for coffee in order to obtain an estimate of price elasticity 2) determine 
the existence of market power and 3) explore empirical evidence related to the 
existence  of  a  coffee  paradox  in  terms  of  elasticity  of  transmission  and  price 
asymmetry  between  the  export  and  domestic  price  of  coffee.  To  accomplish 
these  objectives,  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  a  review  of  the 
pertinent literature is conducted.  Second, data and methodology specifications, 
including  the  export  supply  model,  price  equation,  and  profit  equation,  are 
discussed.  Third,  a  cointegration  test  is  utilized  to  examine  the  annual  data. 
1 International Coffee Organization
2 ‘coffee paradox’ or ‘coffee crisis’ is characterized by a special feature as follows:
Increase of export volume contributes to decrease of export coffee price (see Figure
1). However, decrease of export coffee price causes increase of retail coffee price
in importing countries. Therefore, this situation contributes to the depression of cof-
fee producer and profit structure. That is, ‘coffee paradox’ defines that the differ-
ences between export coffee price and retail coffee price are gradually increased.Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 109







































  Note:  EXC  and  EXCP  denote  export  coffee  volume  and  export  coffee  price, 
respectively. 
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Ordinary  Least  Square  (OLS)  is  then  used  to  estimates  the  export  supply 
function. Analysis is also conducted using Instrumental Variable (IV) models to 
examine  the  impact  of  exogenous  variables  on  export  coffee  prices,  and 
Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression  (SUR) in  the  case  of simultaneous  equations. 
The  empirical  results  of  our  specified  export  supply  model  show  how  the  ex-
porting  price  affects  both  the  export  quantity  and  economic  growth,  and  also 
help to determine the existence of market power. The price/profit equations em-
pirically  establish  evidence  for  the  elasticity  of  transmission  and  price 
asymmetry.  Finally,  a  summary  and  conclusion  are  presented  along  with  sug-
gestions  for  future  study.
2. Review of Literature
An extensive literature has evolved in the past decades using economic theory 
to analyze the relationships of trade, economic growth, and market power. This 
section outlines recent studies concerning exporting countries, including empiri-
cal  analyses,  structural  economic  analysis  of  trade  and  economic  growth.
First,  in  order  to  construct  the  export  supply  model,  we  extend  the 
work  of  Bahmani-Oskooee  and  Ltaifa  (1992).  Bahmani-Oskooee  and  Ltaifa 
(1992)  examined  the  effects  of  exchange  rate  on  the  aggregate  exports  of  67 
developed  countries  using  cross-sectional  data.  They  used  an  export  supply 
function3 in terms of capturing the exchange rate effect on trade. Therefore, in 
this  paper,  we  organize  an  export  supply  function  in  the  world  coffee  market 
and  apply  for  the  export  price  elasticity  to  measure  the  profit  equation. 
Second,  several  previous  papers  have  investigated  the  world  coffee 
market,  paying  particular  respect  to  producer  prices  and  price  transmission. 
Karp and Perloff (1993) estimated the degree of competitiveness and the adjust-
ment  paths  of  two  largest  exporters.  Krivonos  (2004)  analyzed  the  impact  of 
coffee sector reforms and considered evidence for which reforms increased the 
share  of  producer  prices  in  the  world  price  of  coffee.  Pierre  (2007)  sought  to 
determine  the  main  source  of  the  coffee  crisis  and  the  coffee  paradox  within 
3 Basic export supply model is as follows: Export quantity=f(export price, total pro-
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fair  trade  coffee.  
Several  other  previous  papers  determined  the  existence  of  asymmetry 
in price transmission. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) estimated the asymmetric re-
lationships between changes in the farm level price of milk and changes in the 
retail prices of major diary products. Mundlak and Larson (1992) analyzed the 
relationship between domestic prices and world prices of agricultural commod-
ities and showed how world prices are transmitted to domestic prices. Mohanty 
et al. (1995) investigated price asymmetry in the international wheat market and 
tested  the  speed  of  price  adjustments  based  on  Houck  (1977). 
Based on previous papers, this analysis will estimate the extended ex-
port supply model, focusing on the exchange rate and economic growth, to de-
termine the elasticity of transmission and to test for price asymmetry using time 
lags  based  on  the  workings  of  Boyd  and  Brorsen  (1988)  and  Mohanty  et  al. 
(1995).        
3. Data  and Modeling
3.1.  Data
The  data  for  this  analysis  is  obtained  from  the  USDA  and  the  International 
Coffee Organization (ICO), and includes variables such as export volume, pro-
duction, and consumption of coffee4. The World Bank database contains varia-
bles  such  as  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP).  Price  databases  are  also  ob-
tained from the ICO. The time period covered ranges from 1976/1977 through 
2006/2007.5 The specific explanations and definitions of estimated variables are 
shown  in  Table  1.  
4 See APPENDIX A.
5 The Augment Dickey-Fuller test results are APPENDIX B.Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 112
TABLE 1. The Definitions of Variables
Variables Definitions
EXC
Total  coffee  export  quantity  (1000  bags)
Source:  USDA  World  Markets  and  Trade  (2008)  and  International  Coffee  Organization
Note:  1  bag=60  kg=132.276  pounds
EXCP
Export  coffee  price  (cents  per  pound)
Source:  USDA  World  Markets  and  Trade  (2008)  and  International  Coffee  Organization
Note:  New  York  Spot  Prices  for  Brazil’s  Arabica  Coffee
TPC Total  coffee  production  (1000  bags)
Source:  USDA  World  Markets  and  Trade  (2008)  and  International  Coffee  Organization
EX  GDP Exporting  countries’  real  gross  domestic  product  (U.S.  dollars)
Source:  The  World  Bank  Database
ER
Real  exchange  rates  for  Reals/U.S.  dollar
Source:  USDA 
Note:  The  Reals  is  the  Brazilian  currency  unit.
CIF/FOB
Ratio  of  Cost  Insurance  and  Freight  (CIF)  to  Free  On  Board  (FOB) 
Source:  International  Coffee  Organization 
Note:  CIF  prices  and  FOB  prices  are  based  on  retail  prices  in  importing  countries  and 
New  York  Spot  Prices  for  Brazil’s  Arabica  Coffee,  respectively.
OIL Annual  average  U.S.  crude  oil  price  (U.S.  dollars/ton)
Source:  Financial  Trend  Forecaster  (www.inflationdata.com)
TEAP Tea  prices  (U.S.  dollars/kg)
Source:  FAO  Tea  Composite  Price  and  ITC  annual  Bulletin 
GP The  prices  paid  to  growers  in  exporting  member  countries  for  Arabica  (cents  per  pound)
  Source:  International  Coffee  Organization
RCP Retail  prices  in  importing  Member  countries    (cents  per  pound)
Source:  International  Coffee  Organization
EX  CR4 Exporting  countries’  concentration  ratio  four 
IM  CR4 Importing  countries’concentration  ratio  four
EXTP
Total  exportable    production  of  exporting  members  (1000  bags)
Source:  International  Coffee  Organization 
Note:  Total  exportable  production  indicates  the  total  production  less  domestic 
consumption  in  producing  countries.
Inventory Inventories  of  green  coffee  in  importing  Member  countries  (1000  bags) 
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3.2.  Empirical  Models 
3.2.1.  Market  Power  and  Export  Supply  Function  for  the  World  Coffee 
Market
Major exporting/importing countries of coffee are shown in Table 2. Major cof-
fee  exporting  countries  are  Brazil,  Colombia,  Vietnam,  Indonesia,  and  Cote 
d’lvoire and major coffee importing countries are the United States, Germany, 
France, and Italy. Figures 2 and 3 indicate the market share and concentration 
ratio  4  (CR4)  based  on  export/import  coffee  volume,  respectively.  On  major 
coffee exporting countries in 2007, Brazil accounted for about 27% of the total 
world coffee market, Vietnam 17%, and Columbia 12%. The CR4 share for ma-
jor exporting countries has gradually increased to over 0.4 since 1977. On ma-
jor importing countries in 2007, the United States accounted for about 24% of 
the total world coffee market, Germany 19%, Italy 7.5%, and France 6%. The 
CR4  share  for  major  importing  countries  has  increased  to  over  0.6  since  the 
1990s.  This  implies  that  the  major  exporting/importing  countries  have  experi-
enced an increase in market power based on the CR4. However, this does not 
imply that market power exists in the international coffee market because CR4 
shares  for  exporting/importing  countries  are  ambiguous.  Therefore,  this  study 
proposes  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  market  concentration  ratio  for  export-
ing/importing countries raises market price, and investigates the relationship be-
tween  CR4  of  exporting/importing  countries  and  coffee.  
TABLE 2. Exporting/Importing Countries for the World Coffee Market
Major  Exporting  Countries Major  Importing  Countries




Cote  d’lvoire Japan
Note:  This  table  is  based  on  the  total  export/import  volumes  from  1977  through  2007 Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 114
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  Note:  CR4  is  based  on  major  importing  countries’  volume.Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 116
First,  this  paper  analyzes  the  existence  of  market  power  in  the  world 
coffee market using the Lerner index. The Lerner index is defined as follows:
P
MC P
power monopoly of index Lerner
-
= (1)
where  P  is  export  price  and  MC  is  the  marginal  cost  of  production  of  the 
product. However, the Lerner index of monopoly power requires the ability to 
measure  marginal  cost  but  this  is  not  easily  done.  Moreover,  price  must  refer 
to a constant quality unit since difference in quality implies change in real price 
(Clarkson and Miller, 1982). Therefore, we use another equation instead of the 








6 (2)                                                    
where η is export price elasticity7 for coffee exporting countries. This equation 
is  equally  useful  to  measure  the  degree  of  monopoly.  Although  the  concen-
tration ratio seems to be a useful measure of monopoly power, it has a serious 
shortcoming. Monopoly power is a function not only of a firm’s market share, 
but also of potential supply from either existing firms or firms that could enter 
the industry. Samuelson (1965) mentioned that the monopoly power of that one 
firm  could  be  zero  if  the  potential  supply  elasticity  were  sufficiently large.  In 
other words, a price that yields monopoly profits in this situation will cause the 
existing monopoly to be deluged by new entrants or expansion by existing mar-
ginal  firms  in  the  industry. 








e is the firm’s price elasticity of demand, MS is the market share, M e is the market
price elasticity of demand, and h is the supply elasticity faced by importing
countries. Cole (1991) argued that this relates the Lerner Index of monopoly power
to market share, but has as a critical argument the supply elasticity of the com-
petitive firms. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the relationship between the
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In order to estimate of export price elasticity (η) in exporting countries, we ex-
tend the work of Bahmani-Oskooee and Ltaifa (1990) which formulated the ef-
fects of real exchange rate on export volume with respect to the export supply 
function.  Based  on  the  basic  export  supply  model,  we  construct  an  empirical 
model of which export coffee quantity is affected by export coffee price, total 
production, exporting countries’ GDP, and exchange rate. The empirical model 
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(3)
where  it EXC is aggregated export coffee volume for exporting countries i in pe-
riod  t  t EXCP   represents  export  coffee  price  in  period  t  it TPC   represents  ag-
gregated production  volume  for  exporting  country  i  in  period  t  it GDP EX repre-
sents  aggregated  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  of  exporting  country  i  in 
period t  t ER represents real Brazil Real/U.S.$ exchange rate and  t 1 e
 is an error 
term.
The value of  1 a  indicates export price elasticity for exporting countries. 
The expected signs of  i a  are positive in terms of the traditional export supply 
model  in  which  production,  price,  and  exchange  rate  have  positive  effects  on 
export  volume. 
3.2.2.  Price  Equation
In  order  to  analyze  the  impacts  of  other  factors  affecting  export  coffee  price, 
we assume the price equation with export coffee price as the dependent varia-
ble,  with  explanatory  variables  of  CIF/FOB,  CR4,  tea  prices,  GP,  and  export 
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where  t FOB CIF /  represents the ratio of CIF to FOB prices in period t  t CR EX 4  
represents  the  concentration  ratio  of  four  for  exporting  countries  in  period  t 
t TEAP  represents export tea price in period t  t GP  represents prices paid to grow-Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 118
ers  in  exporting  member  countries  for  Arabica  and  t 2 e
  is  an  error  term. 
Equation (4) will use the sub-equation under the export supply model (Equation 
(3))  for  using  Instrumental  Variable/Generalized  Method  Moments  (IV/GMM). 
Export  coffee  price  is  considered  as  an  endogenous  variable. 
3.2.3.  Marginal  Cost  and  Profit  Equation
Based  on  Equation  (2),  we  obtain  the  marginal  cost  as  follows:
h





From Equation (3), we obtain the estimated result of export price elas-
ticity using OLS and SUR procedure, and then determine the marginal cost for 
exporting countries in period t. Thus, we re-estimate the marginal cost for using 
production  in  period  t  as  follows: 
t t TPC c c MC 1 0 + = (6)
where MC is the marginal cost for coffee exporting countries and TPC is pro-
duction  volume. 
Using the estimated results of the marginal cost function, we obtain the 
total  cost  function  using  through  the  integration  of  Equation  (6)  with  respect 
to total production quantity of coffee in period t. Total production cost function 
in  period  t  is  as  follows: 
) ( ) ( 1 0 t t t t t TPC d TPC c TCP c TPC d MC ò ò + ´ = (7)9
                                               
   
8 In Table 3, we obtain the estimated coefficient of export coffee price. Especially
in Equation (6), we utilize the export price elasticity (−0.1457) based on the OLS
robust.
9 This paper ignores arbitrary constant of integration.
The estimated results and graphs of marginal cost and profit are shown in
APPENDIX C.
In this paper, we use the estimated results of cost equation in terms of APPENDIX
C.Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 119




t t t TPC
c
TPC c TC ´ + ´ = (8)
where  TC  is  total  cost  in  exporting  countries.
The  general  profit  function  is  defined  as  follows:
) ( ) (Pr Pr t t t t Cost Total Quantity ice ofit - ´ = (9)
Using Equations (8) and (9), we obtain the coffee exporting countries’ 
profit  equation.  Also,  we  focus  on  the  relationships  between  profit  and  price 
asymmetry with respect to empirical analysis10. In order to construct the empiri-
cal model, we assume the profit equation, the profit of which is based on the 
transportation cost (such as oil price), retail/export coffee price difference, and 
the prices paid to growers in exporting countries. The empirical profit equation 
is  defined  as  follows: 
t t t t t t GP Log e EXCP RCP Log e OIL Log e e ofit Log 3 2 2 1 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (Pr e + + - + + = (10)
In  this  paper,  we  use  Equation  (10)  as  the  profit  equation  to  determine  price 
asymmetry  between  retail  and  export  prices  for  coffee. 
3.2.4.  Elasticity  of  Transmission  and  Price  Asymmetry
One reason the world coffee market exhibits a dramatic response to fluctuation 
10 Daviron and Ponte (2005, page 220) argued that a part of the solution to the com-
modity problem entails embedding symbolic quality attributes into commodity
production. That is, once coffee is blended and roasted, it is sold to consumers un-
der a brand name with essentially no further information on its material quality.
This implies that roasters use brand reputation as a proxy for variance in material
quality (Daviron and Ponte, 2005, page 220). In other words, this means that a
higher price doesn't necessarily buy a better coffee. Therefore, they mentioned that
roasters have complete information on material quality when they buy coffee, and
they release next to no information on material quality to their clients (Daviron and
Ponte, 2005, page 220).Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 120
in retail and export prices is the asymmetric response of domestic consumer pri-
ces to a change in world prices (Morisset, 1997). Morisset (1997) analyzed the 
relationships between variations in world and domestic prices in extending the 
work  of  Mundalck  and  Larson  (1992).  This  paper  is  based  on  the  work  of 
Morisset (1997) and included the relationships between retail prices and the pri-
ces  paid  to  growers  in  exporting  member  countries  of  Arabica  coffee.
In order to estimate the retail price adjustment, we construct Equation 
(11)  in  which  retail  price  (RCP)  is  affected  by  related  price  factors  (export 
price, exchange rate, retail price of t-1 period, and producers’ price). The gen-
eral  model  of  retail  price  adjustment  is  estimated  as  follows:
t t t t t t GP Log RCP Log ER Log EXCP Log RCP Log 4 4 1 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( e a a a a a + + + + + = - (11)
The coefficients  2 1 a a and 11 are the elasticity of changes in the retail 
prices  with  respect  to  the  changes  in  the  export  price  and  the  prices  paid  to 
growers  in  exporting  member  countries  of  Arabica,  respectively,  and  are  ana-
lyzed as the elasticity of transmission. Using Equation (11), we show that there 
exists a significant and positive relationship between these two prices and that 
this  relationship  is  asymmetric. 
To test for price asymmetry, we follow the works of Boyd and Brorsen (1998) 
and  Mohanty  et  al.  (1995).  They  analyze  the  static  asymmetry  for  Houck’s 
model. In this paper, we construct a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model which 
is  based  on  RCP  with  an  explanatory  variable,  and  EXCP,  GP,  (RCP-EXCP), 
and (RCP-GP) with dependent variables. And we selected optimal lag variables 
based  on  the  AIC  (Akaike  Information  Crieterion),  SBIC  (Schwartz  Bayesian 
Information  Criterion),  and  HQIC  (Hannan-Quinn  Information  Criterion).  The 
structure  model  on  which  this  paper  is  based  can  be  written  as: 
11 If 1 1 2 1 = = a a and , there is perfect correlation within commodity prices.Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 121
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This  analysis  tests  two  asymmetric  hypotheses  (Boyd  and  Brorsen, 
1988).  The  first  test  is  that  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  export  coffee  price 
(EXCP) and the prices paid to grower (GP) is the same for retail prices (RCP) 
increase, and the second test is that total effects of export coffee price (EXCP) 
and the prices paid to grower (GP) changes are the same for retail prices (RCP) 
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Kinnucan and Forker (1987) and Balke, et al. (1998) indicate that mar-
ket power is the main factor for the asymmetric response in price changes. This 
study  analyzes  the  impacts  of  concentration  ratio  or  market  power  within  ex-
port/import countries on different changes between retail coffee price and export 
coffee price.14 It also investigates the impacts of the supply side with respect 
to  exportable  production  in  exporting  countries  and  inventory  in  importing 
countries on the difference changes of retail and export coffee prices  as fol-
lows: 
12 The optimal lags of VAR model are selected by the minimum values of AIC, SBIC,
and HQIC. In Equation (12), the optimal lags of EXCP, GP, (RCP-EXCP), and
(RCP-GP) are “2”, respectively.
13 Both hypotheses can be tested by the restriction using F-test
14 Kelton and Weiss (1989, page 41) proposed to test the basic hypothesis which held
that concentration ratio raises price. They constructed a price equation that includes
explanatory (price) and dependent (CR4) variables. They found strong evidence that
rising concentration does tend to lead to price rises. However, Marion and Geithman
(1995) investigated the hypothesis that packer monopsony power had a significant
negative effect on cattle prices during the 1971-86 period. They found that cattle
prices are negatively affected by increased packer concentration ratio.Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 122
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where  t EXTP   represents  total  exportable    production  of  exporting  members  in 
period  t  t Inventory   represents  inventories  of  green  coffee  in  importing  member 
countries  in  period  t  and  t 6 e
  is  an  error  term.    Using  Equation  (13),  we  can 
investigate  the  source  of  price  asymmetry  including  exporting/importing  coun-
tries’  market  power,  total  production  volume,  and  inventory.   
3.3.  Cointegration  Tests
Given annual data, we pre-test for stationarity and the existence of a cointegra-
tion vector prior to specification of the model. In each OLS and simultaneous 
equations,  we  obtain  the  results  of  Engle-Granger  (EG)16  test  which  estimates 
a unit root test on the residual from the regression model. The null hypothesis 
of this test is that the residuals are non-stationary. With respect to results from 
both  the  OLS  and  simultaneous  equations,  we  conclude  that  the  residuals  are 
stationary, which means that the dependent variables and explanatory variables 
of each regression model are cointegrated. Also, we call the estimated equation 
the static relationship function and interpret it as long run parameters (Greene, 
1990).         
3.4.  Instrumental  Variables  (IV)  and  Seemingly  Unrelated 
Regression  (SUR) 
Instrumental variables (IV) can be used to produce a consistent estimator of a 
parameter  when  the  explanatory  variables  are  correlated  with  the  error  terms 
(Greene, 1990). Baum and Schaffer (2003) also discussed IV estimation in the 
broader  context  of  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  procedure. 
15 Also, APPENDIX D investigates the relationships between export coffee price/retail
prices and CR4 for exporting/importing countries, respectively.
16 See Engle and Granger (1987)Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 123
The Breusch-Pagan, Hansen, and Anderson statistics are standard tests 
for  detecting  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  in  an  OLS  model  in  terms  of 
processing the IV and GMM. We test for over-identification using the Hansen 
J-test. The resulting test statistics show that over-identification is not a problem 
in the equation. We also test the validity of any instruments using the Anderson 
test.  This test has  a null  hypothesis that  the  instruments are  uncorrelated with 
the error term. In terms of the results, all cases reject the null hypothesis. Thus, 
we conclude that at least one instrument variable is not correlated with the ran-
dom  errors. If  the  instrument variables are  not  exogenous, then  the  IV  proce-
dure  is  not  consistent  and  there  is  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  the  instrument. 
The  Breusch-Pagan  test  illustrates  that  this  equation  has  a  heteroskedasticity 
problem in terms of rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, this equation is es-
timated  with  IV/GMM  procedure  due  to  the  existence  of  autocorrelation.  
The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) was developed by Zellner 
(1962) as a procedure for analyzing a system of multiple equations. An econo-
metric  model  may  contain  multiple  equations  which  are  independent  of  each 
other on the surface. Especially, a set of equations that may be related not be-
cause  they  interact  but  because  their  error  terms  are  related  (Greene,  1990). 
Therefore, this paper investigates several sub-equations to analyze the simulta-
neous equations whose dependent variables are determined by the simultaneous 
interaction  of  several  relationships.   
4. Estimation  and Results
4.1.  Results  for  Estimated  Export  Supply  Model
Table  3  displays  the  estimated  results  of  the  export  supply  model  (Equation 
(3)). Because of problems with heteroskedasticity, we use the robust OLS and 
generalized method of moments (GMM). The coefficients of export coffee price 
on  export  coffee  volume  are  −0.1457,  −0.1636,  and  −0.1395  with  statisti-
cally significance in the robust OLS, IV/GMM, and SUR models, respectively. 
This  implies  that  the  changes  of  export  coffee  price  respond  inelastic  on  the 
export coffee volume. Applying Equation (2), the inelasticity of export price on 
export volume causes to exist of market power in exporting countries. Also, a Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 124
1% change in export coffee price decreases exported coffee volume by less than 
1%. In the general export supply model, the relationships between export vol-
ume  and  export  price  are  positive  in  sign  while  the  results  of  this  paper  are 
not  positive  because  there  are  negative  trends  for  export  volume  and  export 
price (see Figure 1). That is, exporting countries tend to increase their exporting 
volumes even if export prices decrease. This causes decreased profit in export-
ing  countries  and  a  “coffee  crisis”  for  producers.       
The effects of economic growth, the exchange rate, and production on 
export  volume  are  positive  statistically  significant  and less  than  one.  This  im-
plies  that  increases  in  economic  growth,  the  exchange  rate,  and  production 
cause  export  volume  to  increase.   
TABLE 3. Estimated Results of Export Supply Model































R-square 0.9033 0.9022 0.9032
Observations 31 31 31















Note:  Dependent  variable  is  Log(EXC).  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90% 
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4.2.  Results  for  Estimated  Price  Equation
Table  4  presents the  results of  price  equations for  both  robust OLS and  SUR 
models.  The  effects of  the  CIF/FOB ratio  on  the  export coffee price  are  neg-
ative and statistically significant. The CIF/FOB ratio serves as a proxy for the 
transportation  costs  between  exporting  and  importing  countries.  However,  the 
negative  effects  of  the  CIF/FOB  ratio  on  the  export  coffee  price  implies  that 
an increase in transportation cost decreases the export coffee price and increases 
the  difference  between  exporting  and  importing  country  coffee  prices. 
The concentration ratios for major exporting countries have positive ef-
fects on the export coffee price but are statistically insignificant. Thus, the mar-
ket  power  of  exporting  countries  does  not  influence  the  export  coffee  price. 
In addition, tea prices (considering tea as a coffee substitute) have pos-
itive and statistically significant effects on the export coffee price. Increases in 
the  tea  price  act  to  increase  coffee  price.    
TABLE 4. Estimated Results of Price Equation
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The effects of prices paid to growers in exporting countries for Arabica 
are to increase export coffee price with statistical significance. The increase of 
export coffee volume negatively affects the export coffee price. These two re-
sults imply that the increase of prices paid to growers corresponds with the in-
crease of export prices, but the increase of export volume results in decreased 
export prices. According to recent trends (see Figure 1), prices paid to growers 
in exporting countries have gradually decreased, while export coffee volume has 
increased since 1977. Thus, the export coffee price has gradually decreased due 
to  a  decrease  in  producers’  prices  and  an  increase  in  export  volumes. 
4.3.  Results  for  the  Profit  Equation
The  estimated  results  of  Equation  (10)  are  as  follows:
) 81 . 2 ( * * * 8109 . 0 31 63 . 21 ) 27 , 3 ( 6731 . 0
* * ) 64 . 2 ( * * * ) 28 . 5 ( ) 43 . 1 ( * * * ) 19 . 36 (
) ( 1033 . 0 ) ( 3195 . 0 ) ( 0717 . 0 2864 . 7 ) (Pr
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GP Log EXCP RCP Log OIL Log ofit Log t t t t t
Note:  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95% 
confidence  level.  ***  indicates  99%  confidence  level
According  to  robust  OLS  for  the  profit  equation,  the  elasticity  of  the 
difference  between  retail  and  export  coffee  price  on  profit  in  exporting  coun-
tries is −0.3195 with statistical significance. This means that the difference be-
tween retail and export coffee price negatively affects the exporting countries’ 
profit. As the difference between two prices increases, the exporting country’s 
profits decrease.  However,  the  increase  in producers’  received  prices  cause  an 
increase in profit for exporting countries. Therefore, the differences between re-
tail and export price are one of the main factors contributing to a reduction in 
exporting  countries’  profit.
4.4.  Results  for  Elasticity  of  Transmission  and  Price  Asymmetry
The estimated elasticity of transmission indicates a positive and statistically sig-
nificant  relationship  between  export  coffee  price  and  retail  price  as  follows: Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 127
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Note:  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95% 
confidence  level.  ***  indicates  99%  confidence  level
 The coefficient of EXCP is the elasticity of world coffee prices on re-
tail coffee prices, and is analyzed here as the elasticity of transmission. The es-
timated value of EXCP is 0.1576 and implies that variations in world prices are 
inelastically  transmitted  to  retail  price.  That  is,  a  one  percentage  change  of 
world coffee price  changes retail  coffee price  by  0.1576%. And the  estimated 
results of price asymmetry (Equation (12)) and tests for hypotheses are as fol-
lows:
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Note:  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95% 
confidence  level.  ***  indicates  99%  confidence  level
The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  prices  paid  to  grower  (GP)  is  0.347 
with statistical significance. That is, a 1% change of GP affects the increase of 
retail price by 0.347%. And the estimated coefficient of the difference between 
RCP and GP is 1.049 with statistical significance and this implies that the in-
creasing of the difference between retail price and the prices paid to grower has 
17 Test 1 and 2 results are F(1.16)=25.61 with p-value=0.0001 and F(1.16)=17.91 with
p-value=0.0006, respectively. Although this study follows the work of Boyd and
Brorsen (1988) to analyze the elasticity of transmission and price asymmetry in the
estimated results of equations (11) and (12), the relationships between retail price
and export coffee price are ambiguous. However, this study focuses on the relation-
ships between the difference of coffee prices (based on export/import coffee prices)
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contribute  to  the  increase  of  retail  price.  Therefore,  the  asymmetry  of  retail 
price  and  the  prices  paid  to  grower  is  a  main  factor  which  influences  the  in-
crease  of  retail  price.
The first test is to determine whether the speed of adjustment for both 
EXCP  and  GP  is  the  same  as  for  an  increase  in  RCP.  The  second  test  is  to 
ascertain whether the total effects of EXCP and GP changes are the same for 
RCP  increasing  changes.
The first asymmetry hypothesis is tested by determining whether there 
is a significant difference between EXCP and RCP, and GP and RCP changes. 
An  F-test  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  these  coefficients  are  equal.  The  second 
asymmetry  hypothesis  is  whether  there  is  a  significant  difference  between  the 
sum  of  the  coefficients  of  EXCP  and  GP  changes.  The  F-test  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis.  Therefore,  empirical  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that  export 
coffee price and the price paid to growers in exporting countries respond asym-
metrically  to  changes  in  retail  coffee  price.   
4.5.  The  Reason  for  Price  Asymmetry
Balke et al. (1998) mentioned that the reasons for price asymmetry are market 
power, search cost, and inventories in importing countries. To analyze the caus-
es  of  price  asymmetry,  this  analysis  used  a  simple  regression  model  with  the 
logarithm of  differences for retail and export coffee price as the dependent var-
iable  and  with  selling/buying  power,  exportable  production,  and  inventory  in 
importing  countries  as  explanatory  (independent)  variables.  The  estimated  re-
sults  are  written  as: 
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Note:  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95% 
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The  estimated coefficient of importing country CR4 of 5.7315 is stat-
istically significant. This implies that the change in importing countries’ buying 
power has a positive influence on price differences. The estimated values of ex-
portable production in exporting countries and inventory in importing countries 
are positive in sign but are not statistically significant. That is, the supply side 
of the world coffee market is not the main factor which brings about changes 
in retail and export coffee prices. Therefore, with the evidence of price asym-
metry, we conclude that importing countries’ market power in the world coffee 
market  affects  the  price  asymmetry  for  both  retail  and  export  coffee  prices.
5. Summary  and  Conclusions
The main purpose of this analysis was to estimate an export supply model for 
the world coffee market, and to examine empirical evidences for the coffee par-
adox in terms of price/profit equations and price asymmetry. Using annual crop 
data  from  1977  to  2007,  the  main  findings  are  as  follows:
First,  coffee  exporting  countries  have  market  power  in  terms  of  rela-
tionship  between  export  coffee  price  and  export  volume.  Export  coffee  price 
and export volume have a negative relationship. This explains the phenomenon 
when  the  export  coffee  price  has  decreased  even  though  export  volume  has 
increased.
Second,  an  increased  margin  between  export  and  retail  coffee  prices 
has contributed to the decrease in profit amongst exporting countries. Increased 
export coffee price has a positive effect on the retail price. Moreover, the varia-
tion  in  export  prices  is  imperfectly  transmitted  to  the  retail  price.
Third, the  phenomenon of price  asymmetry exists  in  the  world coffee 
market, and price asymmetry is a main factor which contributes to lower profits 
in exporting countries. The market power of importing country is a major factor 
contributing  to  price  asymmetry.  
In  conclusion,  the  world  coffee  market  is  characterized  by  a  “coffee 
paradox”  based  on  these  empirical  results.  Inconsistent  changes  in  both  retail 
and  export  coffee  prices,  resulting  from  price  asymmetry,  have  served  to  de-
creased profit in exporting countries. Price asymmetry, which is influenced by 
buying  power,  is  the  main  piece  of  evidence  supporting  the  existence  of  the Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 130
coffee  paradox. 
In future research, reconstruction and concentration movements, which 
may exist in the world coffee market and result in hidden market power within 
importing countries, should be investigated. This paper suggests that the buying 
power  of  importing  countries  is  the  main  factor  contributing  to  the  existence 
of price asymmetry. However, Pierre (2007) argued that at the trader level the 
top three companies (Neumann, Volcafe, and Ecom) control approximately 45% 
of the total coffee market, and Philip Morris, Nestle, Sara Lee, and Procter and 
Gamble  control  approximately  69%  of  the  coffee  market  at  the  roaster  level. 
Thus, analysis should be conducted to determine the existence of hidden market 
power within the  world coffee  market, and verify resulting price asymmetries.Empirical  Evidences  from  a  Coffee  Paradox:  An  Export  Supply/Price  Asymmetry  Approach 131
APPENDIX A. Descriptive Data
Variables Observations Mean Std Min Max
Log(EXC) 31 7.6203 0.1068 7.3523 7.7961
Log(EXCP) 31 2.0497 0.2048 1.654 2.488
Log(TPC) 31 4.7442 0.1052 4.5356 4.9204
Log(EX  GDP) 31 11.7875 0.2339 11.3465 12.2212
Log(ER) 31 0.105 0.1588 −0.1625 0.419
Log(CIF/FOB) 31 0.4367 0.1986 0.0525 0.8118
Log(OIL) 31 1.5873 0.2009 1.1959 1.9898
Log(TEAP) 31 2.66 0.1276 2.4894 2.8873
Log(GP) 31 1.8318 0.1818 1.4899 2.1923
Log(RCP) 31 2.4865 0.0591 2.3929 2.6139
Log(EX  CR4) 31 −0.2914 0.0557 −0.4143 −0.1825
Log(IM  CR4) 31 −0.2111 0.0182 −0.2397 −0.1723
Log(EXTP) 31 4.624 0.1121 4.3881 4.8152
Log(Inventory) 31 3.8805 0.1721 3.605 4.1245
Note:  Definitions  of  estimated  variables  are  the  same  in  Table  1.Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 132
APPENDIX B. Results of Unit Root Test
The  unit  root  test  determines  the  order  of  integration  for  those  variables  that 
are  under  consideration.  The  measure  employed  for  testing  the  order  of  in-
tegration is known as the Augment Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. This procedure’s 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of all the variables, when 
first difference variables are used. With respect to the results, we can interpret 
these  parameters  as  long-run  parameters  (see  Greene,  1990,  page  650).  The 
ADF  test  results  are  as  follows:
Variables
ADF  in  Levels
Lag(0)


























































































































Notes:  Definitions  of  estimated  variables  are  the  same  in  Table  1.  t-values  are  in 
parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95%  confidence 
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Note:  This  graph  is  based  on  the  estimated  results  of  marginal  cost  as  follows:
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Note:  This  graph  is  based  on  the  estimated  results  of  profit  as  follows:
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APPENDIX D.
Following  up  the  works  of  Kelton  and  Weiss  (1989)  and  Marion  and 
Geithman(1995), this study investigates the relationships between export coffee 
prices/retail prices and CR4 for exporting/importing countries, respectively. We 
assume  that  coffee  prices  are  affected  by  CR4  and  inventory,  and  the  simple 
log-log  models  are  organized  as  follows:
Log(EXCP)=f(Log(EXCR4),  Log(IMCR4),  Log(Inventory))
Log(RCP)=f(Log(EXCR4),  Log(IMCR4),  Log(Inventory))
The  OLS  results  of  the  simple  log-log  models  are  as  follows:
6187 . 0
) 37 . 0 ( * * ) 86 . 2 ( ) 54 . 0 ( * * * ) 22 . 6 (
) ( 0331 . 0 ) 4 ( 2282 . 1 ) 4 ( 142 . 0 8331 . 2 ) (
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Note:  t-values  are  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  90%  confidence  level.  **  indicates  95% 
confidence  level.  ***  indicates  99%  confidence  level.  Definitions  of  estimated 
variables  are  the  same  in  Table  1. 
In  the  estimated  results,  importing  countries’  CR4  on  export  coffee  price  has 
a  negative  effect  with  statistical  significance.  However,  importing  countries’ 
CR4 on retail coffee price has a positive effect with statistical significance. This 
implies that major coffee importing countries’ market power affects the export-
ing/importing  coffee  prices  rather  than  exporting  countries’  market  power  or 
supply  sides.Journal  of  Rural  Development  32(3) 136
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